Testing subgame perfection apart from fairness in ultimatum games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:862841
DOI10.1007/s10683-006-0064-7zbMath1153.91359OpenAlexW2109049917MaRDI QIDQ862841
Emily Blanchard, James Andreoni
Publication date: 24 January 2007
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-0064-7
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Cites Work
- Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic
- Inference by Believers in the Law of Small Numbers
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- Adaptive learning versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining
