Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations: An experimental study

DOI10.1007/s10683-006-7056-5zbMath1151.91591OpenAlexW2086380756MaRDI QIDQ862851

David J. Cooper, Jordi Brandts

Publication date: 24 January 2007

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-7056-5

zbMATH Keywords

ObservationCoordinationExperimentsIncentivesOrganizations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research (90B25) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (6)

Information transparency and equilibrium selection in coordination games: an experimental study ⋮ Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games ⋮ Coordination via delay: theory and experiment ⋮ Maximum effort in the minimum-effort game ⋮ When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory ⋮ Leading to efficient coordination: individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game

Cites Work

• The Spectra of Multiplier Transforms on l p
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
• Unnamed Item

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