Credible implementation

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.001zbMath1153.91398OpenAlexW4233238550MaRDI QIDQ863264

Simon Wilkie, Bhaskar Chakravorty, Luis C. Corchon

Publication date: 26 January 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

credibilityimplementationcommitmentrenegotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

The theory of implementation when the planner is a player ⋮ Sequential commitment games ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Ambiguous implementation: the partition model ⋮ Voluntary implementation ⋮ Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation ⋮ Interactive implementation

Cites Work

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• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Efficiency and Mechanisms with no Regret
• Feasible and Continuous Implementation
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
• Voluntary implementation

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