An experimental study of storable votes

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.004zbMath1151.91413DBLPjournals/geb/CasellaGP06OpenAlexW3122140195WikidataQ56873871 ScholiaQ56873871MaRDI QIDQ863272

Alessandra Casella, Thomas R. Palfrey

Publication date: 26 January 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w9982.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (12)

An experimental study of storable votes ⋮ An experimental study of voting with costly delay ⋮ A simple mechanism for resolving conflict ⋮ Democracy for polarized committees: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants ⋮ Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information ⋮ A method for identifying parameterizations of the compensation election and quadratic voting that admit pure-strategy equilibria ⋮ Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment. ⋮ One man, one bid ⋮ Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes ⋮ Storable votes ⋮ Efficient voting with penalties ⋮ Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets

Cites Work

• Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
• An experimental study of storable votes
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Storable votes
• Optimal Jury Selection: A Game-Theoretic Model for the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Voting with Proportional Veto Power

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