Averting economic collapse and the solipsism bias

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.10.003zbMath1153.91501DBLPjournals/geb/GuarinoHJ06OpenAlexW2142677156WikidataQ57443279 ScholiaQ57443279MaRDI QIDQ863280

Thomas D. Jeitschko, Antonio Guarino, Steffen Huck

Publication date: 26 January 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.10.003

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicscoordinationnetwork externalitiescoordination avalancheeconomic collapsesolipsism bias

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

Social conformity under evolving private preferences

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory
• An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs

This page was built for publication: Averting economic collapse and the solipsism bias