Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium
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Publication:863283
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.005zbMath1154.91360OpenAlexW3124510813MaRDI QIDQ863283
Publication date: 26 January 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.005
congestionexternalitiestransportation networksnetwork topologynonatomic gamesBraess's paradoxwardrop equilibriumtopological efficiency
Related Items (40)
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games ⋮ Excluding Braess’s Paradox in Nonatomic Selfish Routing ⋮ Computation of equilibria and the price of anarchy in bottleneck congestion games ⋮ A Selective Tour Through Congestion Games ⋮ Optimal externalities in a parallel transportation network ⋮ Braess's paradox for flows over time ⋮ Resolving Braess's paradox in random networks ⋮ Negative prices in network pricing games ⋮ On the hardness of network design for bottleneck routing games ⋮ Inefficiencies in network models: a graph-theoretic perspective ⋮ Modifying link capacity to avoid Braess paradox considering elastic demand ⋮ Depletable channels: dynamics, behaviour, and efficiency in network design ⋮ A note on social learning in non-atomic routing games ⋮ The price of anarchy in series-parallel network congestion games ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Capacitated network design games ⋮ The price of anarchy in routing games as a function of the demand ⋮ Efficient methods for selfish network design ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Selfish splittable flows and NP-completeness ⋮ Greediness and equilibrium in congestion games ⋮ A polynomial-time algorithm for detecting the possibility of Braess paradox in directed graphs ⋮ Network topology and equilibrium existence in weighted network congestion games ⋮ Strong equilibrium in network congestion games: increasing versus decreasing costs ⋮ Network characterizations for excluding Braess's paradox ⋮ Congestion games with linearly independent paths: convergence time and price of anarchy ⋮ Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy ⋮ The price of anarchy in nonatomic consumption-relevance congestion games ⋮ Dynamic Atomic Congestion Games with Seasonal Flows ⋮ Informational Braess’ Paradox: The Effect of Information on Traffic Congestion ⋮ Network Topologies for Weakly Pareto Optimal Nonatomic Selfish Routing ⋮ A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares ⋮ Efficient graph topologies in network routing games ⋮ Internalization of social cost in congestion games ⋮ Weighted congestion games with separable preferences ⋮ Social learning in nonatomic routing games ⋮ On weak Pareto optimality of nonatomic routing networks ⋮ Polynomial recognition of vulnerable multi-commodities ⋮ Machine load balancing game with linear externalities ⋮ Braess's paradox in expanders
Cites Work
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- Parallel concepts in graph theory
- Strong equilibrium in congestion games
- Network structure and strong equilibrium in route selection games.
- Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games.
- Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
- Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
- Topology of series-parallel networks
- The Braess paradox
- Braess's paradox and power-law nonlinearities in networks
- CONGESTION GAMES AND POTENTIALS RECONSIDERED
- Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung
- Topological Conditions for Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Networks
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
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