Repeated Downsian electoral competition

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0046-1zbMath1118.91017OpenAlexW2014062452MaRDI QIDQ863396

John Duggan, Mark Fey

Publication date: 26 January 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0046-1

zbMATH Keywords

Folk theoreminfinitely repeated version of the Downsian model of electionsMedian voter theoremSubgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model ⋮ A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games ⋮ Inequality and political consensus

Cites Work

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• A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
• Generic Instability of Majority Rule
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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