Approval voting: three examples

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0053-2zbMath1118.91005OpenAlexW1969774480MaRDI QIDQ863399

Jean-François Laslier, Francesco De Sinopoli, Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 26 January 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0053-2

zbMATH Keywords

Stable setPerfect equilibriumSincere votingSophisticated voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items

Who Wins and Loses Under Approval Voting? An Analysis of Large Elections, Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules, Cycles in synchronous iterative voting: general robustness and examples in approval voting, Equilibria in Doodle polls under three tie-breaking rules, Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting, The strategic sincerity of approval voting, Weighted approval voting, Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates, Weak undominance in scoring rule elections, Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences, Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result, Bargaining through approval, Size approval voting, Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency, The Basic Approval Voting Game, Approval Voting in Large Electorates, Computational Aspects of Approval Voting, Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting, On stable outcomes of approval, plurality, and negative plurality games

Cites Work

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• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting
• Strongly Stable Equilibrium Points of N-Person Noncooperative Games
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the Definition, and Further Results
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation