A simple ``market value bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0055-0zbMath1118.91011OpenAlexW2101965911MaRDI QIDQ863403

Leonard Ray, Guillermo Owen, Bernard Grofman, Ines Lindner, Scott L. Feld

Publication date: 26 January 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/25999

zbMATH Keywords

votingweighted voting gamesbargainingmarket values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Weighted voting, multicameral representation, and power
• Interval measures of power
• L. S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases.
• Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval
• Parliamentary Coalitions: A Tour of Models
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• Power, prices, and incomes in voting systems
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
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