Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.004zbMath1153.91307OpenAlexW2164679170MaRDI QIDQ864884

John Duggan, Francesco Squintani, Dan Bernhardt

Publication date: 13 February 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-142748283

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items

Multidimensional political competition with non-common beliefs ⋮ Private polling in elections and voter welfare ⋮ A model of electoral competition with abstaining voters ⋮ A note on uniqueness of electoral equilibrium when the median voter is unobserved ⋮ Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties ⋮ Pandering and electoral competition ⋮ Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters

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