Entry decisions and bidding behavior in sequential first-price procurement auctions: an experimental study

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.011zbMath1152.91454OpenAlexW1992341910MaRDI QIDQ864888

Jeannette Brosig, J. Philipp Reiß

Publication date: 13 February 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.011

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicssequential auctionsfirst-price procurement auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Sequential auctions with capacity constraints: an experimental investigation ⋮ The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners. A study based on field and laboratory data ⋮ First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model ⋮ An experimental study on sequential auctions with privately known capacities ⋮ Auction mechanisms for allocating subsidies for carbon emissions reduction: an experimental investigation

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• hreg

Cites Work

• Bottom-fishing and declining prices in sequential auctions
• Sequential bidding in auctions of construction contracts
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
• Implicit Cost Allocation and Bidding for Contracts
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game