Hard evidence and mechanism design
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Publication:864889
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.003zbMath1152.91388OpenAlexW3122416291MaRDI QIDQ864889
Publication date: 13 February 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6nb4j2sq
Related Items (18)
Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion ⋮ Persuasion and dynamic communication ⋮ Long information design ⋮ Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification ⋮ Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification ⋮ Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines ⋮ Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information ⋮ Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games ⋮ Implementation with partial provability ⋮ Implementation via rights structures ⋮ Bayesian implementation with verifiable information ⋮ Evidence disclosure and verifiability ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships ⋮ Selling with evidence ⋮ Evidence reading mechanisms ⋮ Experimental design to persuade ⋮ Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons
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