Hard evidence and mechanism design

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.003zbMath1152.91388OpenAlexW3122416291MaRDI QIDQ864889

Jesse Bull, Joel Watson

Publication date: 13 February 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6nb4j2sq

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Related Items (18)

Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion ⋮ Persuasion and dynamic communication ⋮ Long information design ⋮ Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification ⋮ Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification ⋮ Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines ⋮ Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information ⋮ Equilibrium refinement in finite action evidence games ⋮ Implementation with partial provability ⋮ Implementation via rights structures ⋮ Bayesian implementation with verifiable information ⋮ Evidence disclosure and verifiability ⋮ Implementation with evidence ⋮ Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships ⋮ Selling with evidence ⋮ Evidence reading mechanisms ⋮ Experimental design to persuade ⋮ Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons

Cites Work

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• COSTLY EVIDENCE AND SYSTEMS OF FACT-FINDING
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms

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