Market design with endogenous preferences

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.001zbMath1151.91460OpenAlexW3122376464MaRDI QIDQ864892

Ella Segev, Eric Talley, Aviad Heifetz

Publication date: 13 February 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1321

zbMATH Keywords

market designendogenous preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

What to maximize if you must ⋮ The dynamic evolution of preferences ⋮ Evolutionary Selection of Socially Sensitive Preferences in Random Matching Environments

Cites Work

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• What to maximize if you must
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Introducing to the evolution of preferences
• Preference evolution and reciprocity

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