Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.005zbMath1155.91317OpenAlexW2153188212MaRDI QIDQ864894

Hannu Vartiainen

Publication date: 13 February 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/16885

zbMATH Keywords

axiomsbargaining theoryno disagreement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (7)

Endogenous reference points in bargaining ⋮ Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence ⋮ Two simple characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution ⋮ Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining ⋮ On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results ⋮ Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution ⋮ Step-by-step negotiations and utilitarianism

Cites Work

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• A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution
• Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem
• The Bargaining Problem
• Arbitration of Two-party Disputes under Uncertainty
• Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms
• Fair Bargains: Distributive Justice and Nash Bargaining Theory
• Preferences Over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem

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