Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0152-9zbMath1134.91353OpenAlexW2133667021MaRDI QIDQ866929

Arunava Sen, Bhaskar Dutta, H. J. M. Peters

Publication date: 14 February 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/269616/files/twerp722.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (17)

Efficient compromising ⋮ The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences ⋮ The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences ⋮ Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms ⋮ Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers ⋮ Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains ⋮ Truthful ownership transfer with expert advice ⋮ An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case ⋮ Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes. Erratum to: Soc Choice Welfare 28, 163--179 (2007; Zbl pre05126669). ⋮ On random social choice functions with the tops-only property ⋮ Inefficiencies on linking decisions ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Random assignments and outside options ⋮ What proportion of sincere voters guarantees efficiency? ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ Fair sharing under dichotomous preferences ⋮ Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions

Cites Work

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• Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
• Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
• A geometric proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem
• An alternative proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship result
• Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

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