Preferences, the agenda setter, and the distribution of power in the EU

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0155-6zbMath1134.91355OpenAlexW2071242637MaRDI QIDQ866934

Francesco Passarelli, Jason Barr

Publication date: 14 February 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0155-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82)

Related Items (9)

An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index ⋮ The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization ⋮ The complexity of power indexes with graph restricted coalitions ⋮ Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU council of ministers: the consultation procedure ⋮ Probabilistic spatial power indexes ⋮ Power in the Council of the EU: organizing theory, a new index, and Brexit ⋮ Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the council of the European Union ⋮ Who has the power in the EU? ⋮ Probabilistic Owen-Shapley spatial power indices

Cites Work

• Optimal location of candidates in ideological space
• Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003
• The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
• The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision
• Multilinear Extensions of Games
• Unnamed Item

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