Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
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Publication:866940
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0159-2zbMath1134.91382OpenAlexW2106227664MaRDI QIDQ866940
Publication date: 14 February 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2004/59804.pdf
Related Items (10)
Incentives in landing slot problems ⋮ Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods ⋮ Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods ⋮ Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent ⋮ Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information ⋮ Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles ⋮ The \(n\)-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations ⋮ Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences ⋮ Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation ⋮ Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences
Cites Work
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- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
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- On cores and indivisibility
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
- Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
- Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
- Voting by Committees
- Manipulation via Endowments
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
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