Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0159-2zbMath1134.91382OpenAlexW2106227664MaRDI QIDQ866940

Murat Atlamaz, Bettina Klaus

Publication date: 14 February 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2004/59804.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Incentives in landing slot problems ⋮ Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods ⋮ Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods ⋮ Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent ⋮ Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information ⋮ Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles ⋮ The \(n\)-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations ⋮ Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences ⋮ Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation ⋮ Bribe-proof reallocation with single-peaked preferences

Cites Work

• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good
• Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
• Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
• On cores and indivisibility
• Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
• Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment
• Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
• Voting by Committees
• Manipulation via Endowments
• Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores

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