Evolutionary dynamics in public good games

DOI10.1007/S10614-006-9044-4zbMath1161.91322OpenAlexW1989139161MaRDI QIDQ867683

Christiane Clemens, Thomas Riechmann

Publication date: 16 February 2007

Published in: Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-006-9044-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Quantity competition, endogenous motives and behavioral heterogeneity ⋮ Discrete dynamics in evolutionary games

Cites Work

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• Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?
• Public goods, growth, and welfare
• Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
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• A characterization of conditional probability
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Genetic algorithm learning and evolutionary games
• Learning in economics. Analysis and applications of genetic algorithms

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