The procedural value for cooperative games with non-transferable utility

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.009zbMath1273.91031OpenAlexW1973592434MaRDI QIDQ868213

Geoffroy de Clippel

Publication date: 19 February 2007

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.009

zbMATH Keywords

Nash programRaiffa bargaining solutionvalue for NTU games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
• Ståhl's bargaining model
• Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
• A comparison of non-transferable utility values
• Bargaining and Value
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game

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