Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
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Publication:868214
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.07.001zbMath1273.91244OpenAlexW1970776747MaRDI QIDQ868214
Olivier Bochet, Toyotaka Sakai
Publication date: 19 February 2007
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.07.001
Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (4)
Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations ⋮ Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good ⋮ The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
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