Reduced form auctions revisited

DOI10.1007/s00199-006-0080-zzbMath1123.91018OpenAlexW1971667319WikidataQ59708216 ScholiaQ59708216MaRDI QIDQ868419

Kim C. Border

Publication date: 5 March 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-164441362

zbMATH Keywords

theorem of the alternativeasymmetric auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (9)

Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies ⋮ Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings ⋮ Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives ⋮ Asymmetric reduced form auctions ⋮ Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms ⋮ Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments ⋮ Optimization and mechanism design ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion

Cites Work

• On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach

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