Welfare reducing polls

DOI10.1007/s00199-006-0082-xzbMath1109.91339OpenAlexW2047866247WikidataQ59938132 ScholiaQ59938132MaRDI QIDQ868422

Jacob K. Goeree, Jens Großer

Publication date: 5 March 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0082-x

zbMATH Keywords

Correlated preferencesCostly participationToss-up elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (21)

Polling in a proportional representation system ⋮ Robust rational turnout ⋮ Private polling in elections and voter welfare ⋮ Public information and electoral bias ⋮ Impact of information concerning the popularity of candidates on loss-averse voters' abstention ⋮ Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement ⋮ The welfare effects of public opinion polls ⋮ A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs ⋮ Large elections and interim turnout ⋮ Welfare-improving misreported polls ⋮ Electoral turnout with divided opposition ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Voting as a signaling device ⋮ Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections ⋮ Pre-election polling and third party candidates ⋮ Strategic voting when participation is costly ⋮ Verifiable disclosure ⋮ The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting ⋮ Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting? ⋮ Information sharing in democratic mechanisms ⋮ A passion for voting

Cites Work

• Public information and electoral bias
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?

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