Blowing the whistle
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Publication:868431
DOI10.1007/s00199-006-0092-8zbMath1147.91310OpenAlexW2765097964MaRDI QIDQ868431
Jose Apesteguia, Reinhard Selten, Martin Dufwenberg
Publication date: 5 March 2007
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0092-8
Bertrand modelCartelsAmnestyAnti-trustBlow the whistleExperiment communicationImmunityLeniencyPrice competition
Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Experimental studies (91A90)
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Uses Software
Cites Work
- The insiders' dilemma: An experiment on merger formation
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- A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence
- Promises and Partnership
- Firm-specific cost savings and market power
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