Screening ethics when honest agents keep their word

DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0057-3zbMath1109.91392OpenAlexW3125761807MaRDI QIDQ868605

Ingela Alger, Régis Renault

Publication date: 6 March 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/15517/1/alger_renault_et.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Adverse selectionLoyalty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

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Cites Work

• Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
• Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design