Price discrimination and efficient matching

DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0058-2zbMath1109.91393OpenAlexW2006131948MaRDI QIDQ868606

Hao Li, Ettore Damiano

Publication date: 6 March 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0058-2

zbMATH Keywords

ComplementarityRandom pairwise matchingSorting structureSubscription feesVirtual match value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (14)

On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching ⋮ Price competition between random and assortive matchmakers ⋮ Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform ⋮ Tailored recommendations on a matching platform ⋮ Informational hold up and intermediaries ⋮ Two-sided micro-matching with technical progress ⋮ Dress to impress: brands as status symbols ⋮ Matching through position auctions ⋮ Matching with peer monitoring ⋮ Coarse matching with incomplete information ⋮ Entry-deterring agency ⋮ Synchronized matching with incomplete information ⋮ Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information ⋮ Monopolistic Signal Provision

Cites Work

• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Monopoly and product quality
• Screening in a Matching Market
• Monopolistic Signal Provision
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Unravelling of Dynamic Sorting
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Optimal Auction Design
• Marriage and Class
• Coarse Matching

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