Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps

DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0060-8zbMath1109.91370OpenAlexW2141672500MaRDI QIDQ868609

Anup Agrawal, Charles R. Knoeber, Theofanis Tsoulouhas

Publication date: 6 March 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0060-8

zbMATH Keywords

Moral hazardCEO contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (7)

Biased contests for symmetric players ⋮ Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants ⋮ Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium ⋮ A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents ⋮ Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts ⋮ Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments ⋮ Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts

Uses Software

• Unnamed Item

Cites Work

• Contest success functions

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