On `informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games

DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0076-0zbMath1276.91013OpenAlexW2037843723MaRDI QIDQ868625

Mark Voorneveld, Hans Reijnierse, P. E. M. Borm

Publication date: 6 March 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0076-0

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionbimatrix gameleakage of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (2)

Fall back proper equilibrium ⋮ Continuity and equilibrium stability

Cites Work

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• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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