Consistent house allocation

DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0077-zzbMath1109.91366OpenAlexW2167095362MaRDI QIDQ868626

Bettina Klaus, Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 6 March 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0077-z

zbMATH Keywords

Strategy-proofnessIndivisible objectsPriority structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (20)

Overlapping multiple object assignments ⋮ Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics ⋮ On the consistency of random serial dictatorship ⋮ Local and global consistency properties for student placement ⋮ Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods ⋮ Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices ⋮ Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange ⋮ Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness ⋮ Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses ⋮ Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs ⋮ Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents ⋮ Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange ⋮ Efficient assignment respecting priorities ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization ⋮ Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects ⋮ Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices: heterogeneous objects ⋮ Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities ⋮ Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants ⋮ Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses

Cites Work

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• Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
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• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
• Efficient priority rules
• On monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• House allocation with transfers

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