Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0048-zzbMath1109.91308OpenAlexW2128529247MaRDI QIDQ869240

Mattias K. Polborn, Matthias Messner

Publication date: 27 February 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0048-z

zbMATH Keywords

CommunicationStrategic voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (7)

Iterative voting and acyclic games ⋮ Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule ⋮ The two-party system under alternative voting procedures ⋮ Balancing the power to appoint officers ⋮ Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting ⋮ The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting ⋮ Examining monotonicity and saliency using level-\(k\) reasoning in a voting game

Cites Work

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• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

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