Communication and bargaining in the spatial model

DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0052-3zbMath1109.91394OpenAlexW2168574421MaRDI QIDQ869241

Adam Meirowitz

Publication date: 27 February 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0052-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Social choice (91B14) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (1)

Expert advice to a voting body

Cites Work

• Co-ordination, spillovers, and cheap talk
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• The simplest equilibrium of a majority-rule division game
• Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening models
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Virtual Bayesian Implementation
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Deliberation and Voting Rules

This page was built for publication: Communication and bargaining in the spatial model