A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0056-zzbMath1109.91327OpenAlexW1617335936MaRDI QIDQ869242

Francesco De Sinopoli, Giovanna Iannantuoni

Publication date: 27 February 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0056-z

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (15)

Polling in a proportional representation system ⋮ Incomplete information, proportional representation and strategic voting ⋮ Poisson voting games under proportional rule ⋮ Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters ⋮ Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms ⋮ Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case ⋮ Extreme parties and political rents ⋮ Power sharing and electoral equilibrium ⋮ The effect of ideology on policy outcomes in proportional representation systems ⋮ Electing a parliament ⋮ The two-party system under alternative voting procedures ⋮ Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections ⋮ Electoral competition with strategic voters ⋮ Proportional representation with uncertainty ⋮ Party formation and coalitional bargaining in a model of proportional representation

Cites Work

• A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation
• A purely non-cooperative model of divided government
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems
• A Theory of Divided Government

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