Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2006.04.020zbMath1123.91020OpenAlexW2014974231MaRDI QIDQ869596

Dharmaraj Veeramani, Debasis Mishra

Publication date: 8 March 2007

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2006.04.020

zbMATH Keywords

winner determination problemiterative auctionsprocurement auctionsVickrey-Dutch auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production models (90B30) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

A Lagrangian approach to the winner determination problem in iterative combinatorial reverse auctions ⋮ Fraction auctions: the tradeoff between efficiency and running time ⋮ The beauty of Dutch: ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale ⋮ Analyzing online B2B exchange markets: asymmetric cost and incomplete information ⋮ A Pareto optimal auction mechanism for carbon emission rights ⋮ An Auction Approach for Cost and Schedule Management of IT Outsourcing Project ⋮ Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions

Cites Work

• Auction design with costly preference elicitation
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions
• Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
• Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

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