On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.010zbMath1142.91474OpenAlexW2116764051MaRDI QIDQ869853

James Schummer, Rakesh V. Vohra, Sven de Vries

Publication date: 9 March 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.010

zbMATH Keywords

dualityprimal-dual algorithmsubgradient algorithmcombinatorial auctionsVickrey auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (31)

An efficient ascending auction for private valuations ⋮ Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model ⋮ Iterative Auction Design for Tree Valuations ⋮ Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions ⋮ Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items ⋮ Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations ⋮ A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences ⋮ Fraction auctions: the tradeoff between efficiency and running time ⋮ Coordination of manufacturing and engineering activities during product transitions ⋮ Walrasian equilibria from an optimization perspective: A guide to the literature ⋮ Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions ⋮ On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts ⋮ Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study ⋮ Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions ⋮ Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences ⋮ First price package auction with many traders ⋮ Combinatorial auctions ⋮ Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity ⋮ Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions ⋮ Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction ⋮ On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions ⋮ Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case ⋮ Core and pricing equilibria in combinatorial exchanges ⋮ Ascending price Vickrey auctions ⋮ Position auctions with multi-unit demands ⋮ Computing Walrasian equilibria: fast algorithms and structural properties ⋮ A new pricing scheme based on DEA for iterative multi-unit combinatorial auctions ⋮ Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions ⋮ Allocative efficiency in simulated multiple-unit combinatorial auctions with quantity support ⋮ Auction design with costly preference elicitation ⋮ Core Pricing in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers: Computational Hardness and Algorithmic Solutions

Cites Work

• The English auction with differentiated commodities
• The package assignment model.
• Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• The Lagrangian Relaxation Method for Solving Integer Programming Problems
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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