Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
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Publication:869861
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.012zbMath1142.91494OpenAlexW2037319152MaRDI QIDQ869861
Publication date: 9 March 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.012
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (8)
Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods ⋮ Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems ⋮ Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles ⋮ Market structure and matching with contracts ⋮ Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization ⋮ Matching with restricted trade ⋮ Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
Cites Work
- Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods
- Barriers to trade and disadvantageous middlemen: nonmonotonicity of the core
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Rationing a commodity along fixed paths
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Restricted housewapping games
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- On cores and indivisibility
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
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