Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.008zbMath1142.91397OpenAlexW3125648911MaRDI QIDQ869862

Debraj Ray, Kfir Eliaz, Ronny Razin

Publication date: 9 March 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/117963

zbMATH Keywords

groupsdecision-makingpivotalitypreference intensities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

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