Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory
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Publication:869865
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.004zbMath1142.91486OpenAlexW2047999842MaRDI QIDQ869865
Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano
Publication date: 9 March 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.004
Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (15)
The bargaining correspondence: when Edgeworth meets Nash ⋮ Bargaining under monotonicity constraints ⋮ Consensus reaching in committees ⋮ Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule ⋮ A bargaining theory of the firm ⋮ The Owen and Shapley spatial power indices: a comparison and a generalization ⋮ Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index ⋮ The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters ⋮ A noncooperative foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution ⋮ Voting and Power ⋮ On the Nucleolus as a Power Index ⋮ Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives ⋮ Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index ⋮ Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases ⋮ Approximating Nash Social Welfare under Submodular Valuations through (Un)Matchings
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