Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.004zbMath1142.91492OpenAlexW2129885111MaRDI QIDQ869869

David C. Parkes, Debasis Mishra

Publication date: 9 March 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3996850

zbMATH Keywords

primal-dual algorithmcombinatorial auctionsVickrey auctionsmulti-item auctionsuniversal competitive equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Minimax problems in mathematical programming (90C47) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Incentives in Teams
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
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