Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.005zbMath1142.91344OpenAlexW1981678289MaRDI QIDQ869870

William H. Sandholm

Publication date: 9 March 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.005

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionevolutionary game theorypotential gamesimplementation theoryexternality pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Social choice (91B14) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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