On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.06.011zbMath1142.91484OpenAlexW2064250017MaRDI QIDQ869877

Ilan Kremer, Matthew O. Jackson

Publication date: 9 March 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79618/

zbMATH Keywords

competitionasymptotic efficiencyauctionefficient market hypothesisefficient marketsdiscriminatory auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Auction mechanisms for allocating subsidies for carbon emissions reduction: an experimental investigation

Cites Work

• Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
• The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue
• A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
• The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions

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