Optimal nonlinear income taxation with a finite population

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.07.005zbMath1142.91687OpenAlexW1990173755MaRDI QIDQ869884

Jonathan H. Hamilton, Steven M. Slutsky

Publication date: 9 March 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4234936000000000079.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designoptimal income taxationbalanced-budget mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (2)

A bilevel fuzzy principal-agent model for optimal nonlinear taxation problems ⋮ On the optimality of optimal income taxation

Cites Work

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• Implementation of first-best allocations via generalized tax schedules
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

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