Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0038-1zbMath1274.91234OpenAlexW2582194325MaRDI QIDQ870753

David McAdams

Publication date: 15 March 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0038-1

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityasymmetric auctionsfirst-price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals ⋮ Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders ⋮ On monotone approximate and exact equilibria of an asymmetric first-price auction with affiliated private information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• First price auctions: monotonicity and uniqueness
• Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions

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