On participation games with complete information

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0049-yzbMath1116.91008OpenAlexW2129933773MaRDI QIDQ870757

Tasos Kalandrakis

Publication date: 15 March 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0049-y

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsturnoutmonotone equilibriumregular equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (2)

Robust rational turnout ⋮ A dynamic theory of parliamentary democracy

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem.
• On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly
• Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points

This page was built for publication: On participation games with complete information