Rational ignorance and voting behavior

DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0051-4zbMath1221.91025OpenAlexW2154788577WikidataQ56226518 ScholiaQ56226518MaRDI QIDQ870760

César Martinelli

Publication date: 15 March 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0051-4

zbMATH Keywords

voting theoryrational ignorance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (8)

On the drawbacks of large committees ⋮ The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition ⋮ Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections ⋮ Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin? ⋮ Abstention, ideology and information acquisition ⋮ Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence ⋮ Committee design with endogenous participation ⋮ Pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy: costly juror effort and free riding

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information

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