Self-consistency of decision rules for group decision making

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2006.05.013zbMath1121.90354OpenAlexW2049491732MaRDI QIDQ872149

Takehiro Inohara

Publication date: 27 March 2007

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2006.05.013

zbMATH Keywords

game theorygroup decision makingsimple gameArrow's impossibility theoremdecision rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

Cites Work

• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The bankruptcy problem: A cooperative bargaining approach
• New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.
• Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Comparability of coalitions in committees with permission of voters by using desirability relation with hopefulness relation.
• Symmetry of simple games and permission of voters.
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