The least square values and the Shapley value for cooperative TU games

DOI10.1007/BF02579002zbMath1111.90006MaRDI QIDQ874882

Irinel Dragan

Publication date: 10 April 2007

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

inverse problemShapley valuecooperative TU gamesaverage per capita formulaleast square valuespotential basis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)

Related Items (5)

The least square B-nucleolus for fuzzy cooperative games ⋮ Bases and linear transforms of TU-games and cooperation systems ⋮ Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions ⋮ A stochastic approach to approximate values in cooperative games ⋮ Bases and Transforms of Set Functions

Cites Work

• The family of least square values for transferable utility games
• New mathematical properties of the Banzhaf value
• Allocation processes in cooperative games
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• The kernel of a cooperative game
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