Money illusion and coordination failure

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.005zbMath1168.91307OpenAlexW3121695194MaRDI QIDQ876882

Ernst Fehr, Jean-Robert Tyran

Publication date: 19 April 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.005

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibriaequilibrium selectioncoordination gamescoordination failuremoney illusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (5)

Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence ⋮ Smart or stupid depends on who is your counterpart: a cobweb model with heterogeneous expectations ⋮ Dynamic choice, independence and emotions ⋮ The New Keynesian Phillips curve with myopic agents ⋮ Deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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• Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
• The reeded edge and the Phillips curve: Money neutrality, common knowledge, and subjective beliefs
• Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games.
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Loss Aversion and Seller Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
• Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium

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