Money illusion and coordination failure
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Publication:876882
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.005zbMath1168.91307OpenAlexW3121695194MaRDI QIDQ876882
Publication date: 19 April 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.005
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Uses Software
Cites Work
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- Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
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