Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.03.006zbMath1168.91364OpenAlexW1990863003MaRDI QIDQ876888

Debashis Pal, Sudesh Mujumdar

Publication date: 19 April 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.006

zbMATH Keywords

StackelbergCournotmanagerial incentivesleaderfollower

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Related Items (4)

Cournot and Stackelberg equilibrium under strategic delegation: an equivalence result ⋮ Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games ⋮ Extended games played by managerial firms with asymmetric costs ⋮ Managerial delegation contracts, ``green R\&D and emissions taxation

Cites Work

• Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly
• Cournot duopoly with two production periods
• Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication
• Cournot duopoly with two production periods and cost differentials
• On the endogeneity of Cournot--Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation

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