Sequential versus bundle auctions for recurring procurement
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Publication:877780
DOI10.1007/s00712-006-0225-3zbMath1173.91369OpenAlexW2057005802MaRDI QIDQ877780
Publication date: 3 May 2007
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/stawi-ockenfels/pdf/wp_series_download/wp0027.pdf
Related Items
Sequential procurement auctions with risk-averse suppliers ⋮ Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers ⋮ Reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity-constrained ⋮ Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions
Cites Work
- A multiple-object auction with superadditive values
- Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects
- An optimal auction for complements
- Simultaneous auctions with synergies
- Sequential auctions with synergies: An example
- Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions
- Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.
- Auction design with a risk averse seller
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
- Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products
- A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies
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