On top responsiveness and strict core stability

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.11.001zbMath1280.91012OpenAlexW2084941538MaRDI QIDQ878000

Shao Chin Sung, Dinko Dimitrov

Publication date: 4 May 2007

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.11.001

zbMATH Keywords

partitionshedonic gamesstrict core stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Group preferences (91B10)

Related Items

Generating Empirical Core Size Distributions of Hedonic Games Using a Monte Carlo Method ⋮ Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities ⋮ Bargaining cum voice ⋮ Computing Stable Outcomes in Symmetric Additively Separable Hedonic Games ⋮ An empirical distribution of the number of subsets in the core partitions of hedonic games

Cites Work

• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation
• On cores and indivisibility
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability

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