The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
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Publication:878162
DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0061-2zbMath1131.91014OpenAlexW2163254247MaRDI QIDQ878162
Publication date: 26 April 2007
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0061-2
Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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